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Recent Decisions
SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965-NON-VOTING
PURGE STATUTE-The United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge statute
did not deny minorities equal access to the political process.
Oritz v. City of Philadelphia,28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994).
A statistical analysis of Pennsylvania's non-voting purge process revealed that, from 1989 to 1992, more African-American

and other minority registrants were taken off the voting rolls
than white registrants in the City of Philadelphia.' In response
to this disparity, Philadelphia City Councilman, Angel Oritz,
along with Project Vote! and Service Employees International
Union, Local 36, (collectively the "Appellants") brought suit in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, against the City of Philadelphia (the "City") to
challenge the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's non-voting
purge statute (the "Purge Statute").2 The Appellants claimed
1. Oritz v. City of Philadelphia, 824 F. Supp. 514, 526-30 (E.D. Pa. 1993),
affd, 28 F.3d 306 (3d Cir. 1994). The statistical analysis was performed by the
plaintiffs witness, Dr. Allan Lichtman. Oritz, 824 F.Supp. at 526 n.8. At trial, the
district court found Dr. Lichtman's figures to be a true approximation of the disparate effect the purge statute had on minority registrants as contrasted to white
registrants. Id. at 530. In 1989, 4.5 percent of African-American and other minorities
were slated for purging as contrasted to 4.1 percent of white registrants. Id. at 527.
In 1990, figures revealed that the purge rate was 11.7 percent of minorities as contrasted to 8.5 percent of white registrants. Id. The statistical difference in 1990
amounted to a 38 percent higher cancellation of minority registrants than white
registrants. Id. The 1991 purge ratio indicated that 20.8 percent of minorities were
purged as opposed to 17.3 percent of the white voting population. Id. at 529. In
1992, 6.6 percent of minority registrants were slated for purging as contrasted to 6.4
percent of white registrants. Id. at 530 n.11. The court found that reinstatement
rates would have little impact on Dr. Lichtman's figures. Id. at 530.
2. Oritz v. City of Philadelphia Office of the City Commissioners Voter Registration, 28 F.3d 306, 307 (3d Cir. 1994). Registration of Voters; Enrollment of Vot-
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that the purge statute violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 19653 ("Section 2") by denying minority electors an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice.4 The Appellants sought a permaera, Pub. L. No. 115, § 40, (codified as amended at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 623-40
(Supp. 1994)).
A purge statute allows a state to remove voters, who fail to vote in consecutive elections, from its voter registration rolls. The purged voter must then re-register before being permitted to vote. The Pennsylvania Purge Statute at issue in Oritz
provided:
During each year, the commission shall cause all of the district registers to be
examined, and in the case of each registered elector who is not recorded as
having voted at any election or primary during the two calendar years immediately proceeding, the commission shall send to such elector by mail, at his
address appearing upon his registration affidavit, a notice, setting forth that
the records of the commission indicate that he has not voted during the two
immediately proceeding calendar years, and that his registration will be
cancelled if he does not vote in the next primary or election or unless he
shall, within ten days of the next primary or election, file with the commission, a written request for reinstatement of his registration, signed by him,
setting forth his place of residence ....
The cancelation of the registration of
any such elector for failure to vote during two immediately preceding calendar
years shall not affect the right of any such elector to subsequently register in
the manner provided by this act.
PA. STAT. ANN tit. 25, § 623-40.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice ...
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner
which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the
totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally
open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class
have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal
to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973.
4. Oritz, 824 F. Supp. at 516. Appellants also sued the City under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. The district court dismissed these claims because
the court had already decided these issues in a previous Memorandum and Order.
Id. at 540-42. The court dismissed the First Amendment claim holding that
Pennsylvania's purge statute did not violate the First Amendment because the government interest in preventing voting fraud justified the regulation of the non-speech
element of the voting registration procedure. Id. (citing Hoffman v. Maryland, 928
F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1991)). The court dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim
holding that Pennsylvania's non-voting purge statute did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment because the restriction was justified by fulfilling the state's interest in
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nent injunction to halt the City from purging further registrants.5
To establish the Section 2 claim, the district court required
that the Appellants demonstrate that the non-voting purge statute operated, in the totality of the circumstances, to deny minorities equal access to the political process.' The Appellants submitted evidence of historical, social and electoral conditions
which adversely affected minorities' to demonstrate that such
factors resulted in depressed political participation.8 The Appel-

preventing voting fraud and for the reason that the purge was conducted without
regard to race. Oritz, 824 F. Supp.at 540-42 (citing Williams v. Osser, 326 F. Supp.
1139 (E.D. Pa. 1971)).
5. Oritz, 824 F. Supp. at 516.
6. Id. at 522. The district court relied on the United States Supreme Court's
articulation of the operation of the "totality of circumstances" test of Section 2. Id.
(citing Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986)). The Court in Gingles stated, "[tlhe
essence of a section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure
interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred candidates." Gingles,
478 U.S. at 47.
7. Oritz, 824 F. Supp. at 531-39. The Appellants offered extensive evidence
attempting to establish historical, social and electoral disadvantage and discrimination. Id. Based on election returns from previous elections, the court found that
minorities suffered from racially polarized voting. Id. The Appellants also established
that racial appeals occurred in .political campaigns when: white candidates associated
African-American candidates with controversial minority candidates; advertisements
emphasized race; minority candidates were sometimes omitted from campaign literature; and attacks were made on candidates who spoke to minority issues. Id. The
court found that minorities suffered from the unresponsiveness of elected officials
because the City did not provide community development funding, had inequitably
distributed services and that the police force, composed largely of white officers,
abused minorities more often than whites. Id. Minorities attained lower educational
levels as manifested in the fact that 39 percent of African-Americans and 55.3 percent of Latinos failed to graduate from high school as contrasted to 31.9 percent of
whites who did not graduate. id. Minorities were less likely to own homes than
whites. Id. Latino residents of the City were less likely to have adequate health care
due to a lower economic status. Id. The African-American community suffered from a
14.8 unemployment rate, Latino's from a 15.7 percent unemployment rate, as contrasted to 6.1 percent for the white community. Id. The average income of AfricanAmerican's was $25,544, Latino's earned $20,528 on average, as contrasted to a
$35,467 income average for white residents. Id. Twenty-nine percent of African-American residents and 45.3 percent of Latinos fell below the poverty level as contrasted
to only 11.1 percent of white residents. Id.
8. Id. at 535. In 1987, 67.2 percent of African American registrants and 48.6
percent of other minority registrants turned out to vote as contrasted to 69.7 percent
of white registrants. Id. In 1988, 62.1 percent of African-American registrants and
.54.2 percent of other minority registrants turned out to vote as contrasted to 72.5
percent of white registrants. Id. In 1989, 30.5 percent of African-American registrants and 20.8 percent of other minority registrants voted as contrasted to 45.3
percent of white registrants. Id. In 1990, 37.4 percent of African-American registrants and 30.5 percent of other minority registrants voted as contrasted to 54.3
percent of white registrants. Id. In 1991, 58.3 percent of African-American registrants and 44.7 percent of other minority registrants voted as contrasted to 67.2
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lants reasoned that the non-voting purge statute worked with
the adverse conditions to take away the purged registrants right
to vote.9
The district court found that minorities suffered a socio-economic disadvantage and historical discrimination and that these
factors resulted in the depressed political participation. 10 The
court, however, held that the Appellants failed to prove that the
purge statute was dispositive in denying minorities equal access
to the political process."
The district court reasoned that minorities had an opportunity
to re-register and that the burden of re-registering was slight.'
The court noted that the purging process was administered
without regard to race and that the purge statute fulfilled its
purpose by effectively preventing voting fraud.13 These factors,
the court asserted, negated the Appellants' assertion that the
purge statute dispositively caused minorities to be deprived of
their voting rights. 4 Thus, the district court concluded that the
purge statute did not adversely impact minorities and denied
the Appellants' requested relief.'5
The Appellants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit." The issue on appeal was whether
the district court erred by requiring the Appellants to prove
that, in the totality of circumstances, the non-voting purge statute, itself, caused unequal access to the political process. 7
The majority opinion, written by Circuit Judge Garth, 8 relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 9 in which the Supreme Court defined
the operation of the "totality of circumstances" test of Section
2.' The court interpreted the language of Gingles to require a

percent of white registrants. Id.
9. Id. at 539.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Oritz, 824 F. Supp. at 539.
13. Id. at 538-39.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 539.
16. Oritz v. City of Philadelphia, 28 F.3d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1994).
17. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 310.
18. Id. at 307. Circuit Judge Scirica wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 318.
Circuit Judge Lewis dissented and contended that the court misinterpreted and misapplied the causation requirement of Section 2. Id. at 319-47.
19. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
20. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 310 (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. 30). The Supreme Court, in
Gingles, held that an electoral practice violated Section 2 if it interacted with social
and historical conditions to cause minority electoral inequality. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 310
(citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47).
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Section 2 plaintiff to show some casual connection between the
challenged practice and the alleged deprivation of voting
rights." The opinion also cited three other circuit court cases to
support the contention that a challenged practice must be shown
to cause a deprivation of equal access to the political process in
order to violate Section 2.22 Based on this precedent, the court
affirmed the district court's decision that Section 2 required a
plaintiff to prove that the challenged electoral practice acted as
a dispositive force' in causing discrimination.'
The majority reviewed the district court's determination that
the Appellants failed to demonstrate a Section 2 violation using
a clear error standard." Using the results standard provided by
Section 2, the court required the Appellants to demonstrate that
the purge statute denied minorities equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect preferred representatives.2"
After analyzing the trial record, the court concluded that the
purge statute did not cause the disparity between the percentage of the minority and white registrants purged. The court

21. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 310. The Third Circuit also found support for this construction in the Senate Judiciary Reports concerning the 1982 amendment to Section
2. id. at 311 n.6. The Third Circuit quoted the Senate committee's summary of the
amendment which provided that, "[ilf as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process
and to elect candidates of their choice, there is a violation of this section." Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C-.AN.
177, 206 (alteration in original)). The Third Circuit interpreted the committee's language to direct courts to "focus on the challenged procedure and its causal effects on
equal opportunity to participate in the political process." Oritz, 28 F.3d at 311 n.6.
22. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 310-11. See Sales v. Southwest Texas Junior College District, 964 F.2d 1542, 1556 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a racial group's lack of electoral success resulted from failing to vote rather than from an at-large voting system); Irby v. Virginia State Board of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1359 (4th Cir. 1989)
(requiring a plaintiff to show a casual connection between the challenged Virginia
appointive system and minority underrepresentation); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d
1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish a causal
nexus between a Tennessee law disenfranchising convicted felons and discrimination).
23. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 313. The majority interpreted the district court's use of
the term "dispositive force" to mean a cause which was legally dispositive. Id. at 313
n.1.
24. Id. at 313.
25. Id. The Third Circuit emphasized that the determination of whether the
electoral process was equally open to minority persons, "is peculiarly dependent upon
the facts of each case and requires an 'intensely local appraisal of the design and
impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms." Id. at 308-09 (citing Gingles, 478
U.S. at 79).
26. Oritz, 28 F.3d'at 314 (citing Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 397 (1991)).
27. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 313-14. The Third Circuit stated that "[wle are not confronted with an electoral device - such as 'race-neutral' literacy tests, grandfather
clauses, good-character provisos, racial gerrymandering, and vote dilution - which
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attributed the disparity in the purge ratios to the fact that minority groups voted less frequently than white registrants' and
that the purged registrants failed to overcome the slight burden
of having to re-register.' The court emphasized that registrants affected by the purge statute had originally overcome any
disadvantage to register to vote and reasoned that the adverse
conditions could not have affected a registrant who had already
registered to vote. 0 The court thus found the adverse factors to
be irrelevant and concluded that the depressed minority political
participation was caused solely by the individual inaction of the
purged registrants."1 The majority, therefore, affirmed the decision of the district court and held that the purge statute did not
cause a deprivation of minority voting rights.32
Circuit Judge Scirica concurred with the, majority.' The concurrence stressed that the non-voting purge statute was effective
in preventing voting fraud.' 4 In addition, the concurring opinion
noted that the purge statute previously withstood an equal protection challenge."8 The concurrence concluded by criticizing the
National Voter Registration Act' for making it difficult to terminate ineligible registrants from the voting rolls.
discriminates against minorities, which has no rational basis, and which is beyond
the control of minority voters." Id.
28. Id. at 313-14.
29. Id. at 314 n.14.
30. Id. at 315-16. The Third Circuit based this conclusion, in part, on the fact
that the procedures for re-registering were the same as when first registering and
thus could be no more burdensome or complicated than those used to initially register an individual. Id. at 314 n.14 (citing Williams v. Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646, 653
(E.D. Pa. 1972)).
31. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 315-16.
32. Id. at 318. The majority also placed significance on the race-neutral character of the purge process and the purge statute's effectiveness in preventing voting
fraud. Id. at 314. The evidence, according to the majority, also indicated that minorities not only had access to the political process and participated in elections but
were successful in electing minority representatives. Id. at 316. The majority illustrated this point with the fact that minority candidate Wilson Goode won two terms
as mayor of Philadelphia in 1983 and 1987. Id. at 314-15. Additionally, the majority
found the government's interest in preventing voting fraud enough to justify the
purge statute and that the purge statute operated without regard to race. Id. at
314.
33. Id. at 318 (Scirica, J., concurring).
34. Id. at 318-19.
35. Id. at 318 (citing Williams v. Osser, 350 F. Supp. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
The court in Williams stressed the considerable public concern over "phantom voters"
and found the state interest to prevent voting fraud to outweigh the minimal burden
placed on voters to re-register. Williams, 350 F. Supp. at 652-53.
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg to 1973gg-10 (Supp. 1994).
37. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 318-19 n.4 (Scirica, J., concurring) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1973gg(b)(2) (Supp. 1994)). By passing the National Voter Registration Act, Congress
struck a balance between the need to prevent voting fraud and the governmental
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In dissent, Circuit Judge Lewis criticized the majority for
incorrectly interpreting the causation requirement of Section
2(b)."8 According to Judge Lewis, while a causal demonstration
was required, a Section 2 plaintiff need not prove that the particular electoral practice was a dispositive force in the deprivation of voting rights. 9 The dissent opined that the causation
requirement, espoused by the majority, forced the Section 2
plaintiff to do more than was required by Section 2.' The dissent contended that a plaintiff need only show that an electoral
procedure "interacted" with other surrounding conditions to limit
the political opportunities of minorities.41
Furthermore, Judge Lewis criticized the majority for failing to
assume a practical perspective with a "functional view of the
political process," as mandated by Congress.' 2 According to the
dissent, the majority made speculative, oversimplified conclusions based on minority apathy.' The majority, the dissent
opined, also made findings of fact concerning the difficulty of the
re-registration process" and of minority electoral success withinterest to ensure a person's voting rights. See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 318-19. The National Voter Registration Act requires that as state programs attempt to prevent fraud,
such state programs "shall not result in the removal of the name of any person
from the official list of voters registered to vote in an election for Federal office by
reason of the persons failure to vote." 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-6(b)(2).
38. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 323 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
39. Id. Judge Lewis stated that, "Section 2 does not require plaintiffs to prove
that a challenged voting practice or procedure is 'the dispositive force,' or the only
cause, or even the principal cause, of unequal political opportunity." Id. To illustrate
his conception of the proper operation of the totality of circumstances test, Judge
Lewis cited Operation PUSH v. Allain and United States v. Marengo. Oritz, 28 F.3d
at 327-29 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (citing Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp.
1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987), affd sub nom. Mississippi State Chapter, Operation PUSH,
Inc. v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Marengo, 731 F.2d
1546 (11th Cir. 1984)). Judge Lewis also criticized the majority's acceptance of the
term "dispositive" because the term could be interpreted to mean that the challenged
practice caused all of the relevant circumstances. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 323 n.7 (Lewis,
J., dissenting).
40. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 323 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47). The dissent explained the concept of
"interaction" as follows: "[tlhose circumstances - the 'social and historical conditions'
that make up the 'past and present reality' surrounding political processes - create
the factual environment in which a challenged voting practice operates. As such,
they necessarily contribute to the effect that a practice has on individuals' political
opportunities." Oritz, 28 F.3d at 323 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
42. Lewis, 28 F.3d at 322 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at
45); see also S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208.
43. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 336. Judge Lewis criticized the majority for failing to adopt a practical approach to the analysis of the re-registration process. Id. Judge Lewis found
that, from a practical perspective, evidence of low minority reinstatement statistics
(81 percent of 190,000 persons slated for purging in 1991 failed to reinstate them-
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out first engaging in proper and thorough analysis.' The dissent argued that it was necessary to conduct a more profound
inquiry into the causes of low minority voting levels." The dissent reasoned that, as a result of these errors, the majority
in47
correctly gave legal significance to unfounded factors.
Judge Lewis also criticized the majority for burdening the
Appellants with the task of proving a casual connection between
the adverse conditions and depressed minority political participation rates." The dissent argued that once adverse conditions
and depressed minority political participation were proven to
exist, a Section 2 plaintiff need not prove a casual connection
between them.4 The majority, according to Judge Lewis, erred
by speculating on voter apathy when the casual connection had
already been presumed to exist in Appellants' favor."
In conclusion, Judge Lewis warned that, although the National Voting Rights Act could remedy the problems of the non-voting purge process, the majority's misinterpretation and misapplication of Section 2 could detrimentally impact other areas of
electoral law and thus frustrate the purpose of the Voting Rights
Act.61 According to Judge Lewis, the majority occasioned the
perpetuation of discrimination in other electoral laws by making
it more difficult to prove a violation of Section 2.52
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the "Act" or
the "Act of 19 6 5 ")' in order to enforce the Fifteenth Amendselves by re-registering to vote) and the trouble language minorities have with registration forms indicate that re-registration may be a substantial obstacle. Id. at 338.
45. Id. at 340. Judge Lewis took issue with the majority's finding that minorities have had success in electing preferred candidates. Id. Judge Lewis did not find
the establishment of this fact in the trial record. Id. He claimed that the majority
committed an error of law for failing to conduct a proper inquiry into the minority
electoral success before establishing it as a significant factor. Id. at 341. Judge Lewis criticized the majority for measuring the success of minority preferred candidates
by the success of a few minority candidates. Id. According to Judge Lewis, the majority failed to determine what candidates a minority group preferred. Id. at 342.
Judge Lewis argued that the majority failed to consider special circumstances which
could decrease the legal significance of the few successful minority candidates. Id. at
343.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 325, 329, 336-43.
48. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Seass. 29 n.114 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207). According to Judge Lewis, Congress reasoned
that adverse conditions "tend" to depress minority political participation. Oritz, 28
F.3d at 325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
50. Oritz, 28 F.3d at 325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 346.
52. Id.
53. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 439 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-73 (1988)).
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ment." The original draft of Section 2 of the Act was silent as
to what test was to be used to establish a violation. 5 During
the Senate Hearings concerning the drafting of the Act, Attorney
General Katzenbach indicated that the Act covered any electoral
practice that purposefully or resultingly affected a denial of a
person's right to vote on account of race or color.' Following
the passage of the Act, the courts applied
Attorney General
57
Katzenbach's discriminatory effects test.
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2' to incorporate a totality of the circumstances test which was developed from challenges to voting restrictions based upon the Fourteenth Amendment.59 The appellate courts, which subsequently dealt with
Section 2 claims, interpreted the causation requirement of Section 2 differently. This history of Section 2 first discusses the
principal Fourteenth Amendment case Congress used as a basis
for the 1982 amendment to Section 2 and then discusses the
1982 amendment and the different interpretations and applications that have occurred in subsequent case law.
In 1973, in White v. Regester," the United States Supreme
Court considered whether the district court had correctly analyzed an equal protection challenge to a Texas multi-member
redistricting plan. 1 The district court had conducted an inquiry
into the historical, electoral, and socio-economic circumstances of
minorities to determine whether the multi-member districting
plans diluted 2 minority voting strength.63 The Court recog-

54. The Fifteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV.
55. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.CA.N. 177, 195.
56. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 n.50 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 194-95 (quoting Hearings on S. 1564 before the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1965)).
57. See Toney v. White, 476 F.2d 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1973). In Toney, the court
of appeals stated that "section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 . . . prohibits
imposition of any practice or procedure which has the effect of denying or abridging
the right of any citizen to vote on account of race or color." Toney, 476 F.2d at 207.
58. Pub. L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
59. S, REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Seas. 28 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206.
60. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
61. White, 412 U.S. at 763. In White, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the state
from using a legislative redistricting plan on the grounds that the plan failed to
conform to population variations and that the plan diluted the voting strength of minorities in two particular counties. id. at 758-59.
62. "Dilution" means that the quality of one's vote does not equal another's.
See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 141 (1971). An example of dilution occurs
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nized that the use of multi-member districts was not illegal, per
se, but that their validity could be questioned when a multimember district scheme minimized voting power." The Court
then determined that such factors as historical discrimination
and socio-economic disadvantage "overlaid" the multi-member
districting plan and, together, they could operate to diminish the
quality of the minority vote."
The Court found from the record that minorities in the two
counties in question had suffered from historical discrimination
and social disadvantage." Because of discrimination and disadvantage, minorities registered to vote at disproportionately low
levels."7 The Court held that the multi-member districting plan
operated, in the "totality of circumstances," to dilute minority
voting strength."
In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to make it unnecessary

when an apportionment scheme gives the same number of representatives to two
districts with unequal numbers of voters. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 141. Aside from
population based apportionment, questions of dilution also concern the quality of
one's vote in a multi-member district as contrasted to a single-member district. Id.
The Supreme Court has stated that "we have deemed the validity of multi-member
district systems justiciable, recognizing also that they may be subject to challenge
where the circumstances of a particular case may operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population." Id. (citing Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)). The possibility of dilution increases
when the district is large. See Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 143.
63. White, 412 U.S. at 765-68. In Dallas County, the district court found evidence of discrimination in such electoral devices as a Texas majority vote rule and a
"place" rule. Id. Further, only two African-Americans had been slated and elected
from Dallas County to the Texas House of Representatives since the days of the
Reconstruction. Id. Also, in the court's opinion, the Democratic Party failed to respond to the needs of minorities and in the use of racial campaign tactics. Id. In
Bexas County, the district court found that Mexican-Americans historically and presently suffered disadvantages in the areas of education, employment, housing, health
and politics; that Mexican-Americans were concentrated in a specific area of the
county and made up a large percentage (over 78 percent) of the areas population;
that they suffered from language and cultural differences that made it difficult to
participate in the political process; that Mexican-Americans had historically faced
poll taxes and difficult registration procedures and because of these obstacles few
Mexican-Americans registered to vote; that since 1880, only five Mexican-Americans
served in the Texas legislature and that the Texas legislature was unresponsive to
the needs of Mexican-Americans. Id.
64. Id. at 765 (citing Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 142).
65. White, 412 U.S. at 769.
66. Id. at 766-70.
67. Id. at 768-69.
68. Id. at 769. As part of its analysis, the Court considered whether a singlemember districting plan would help remedy the political weaknesses of minorities by
giving them a stronger voice. Id. The Court concluded that the single-member
districting plans would strengthen the political participation and representation of
minorities and thus affirmed the district court's decision to order a single-member
districting plan. Id.
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to prove that a voting practice was purposefully discriminatory.- Congress mandated that a Section 2 plaintiff could prove
that a particular electoral practice was discriminatory by its
results alone.7" Additionally, Congress incorporated the "totality

of circumstances" test into the language of the amendment.71 In
doing so, Congress mandated that a violation of Section 2 could
be established by showing that, based on the totality of circumstances, the political process was not equally open to racial mi-

norities in that those protected classes have less of an opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect preferred representatives.72

In the Senate Report, Congress directed the courts to consider
the objective factors surrounding the plaintiffs situation.73 Con-

gress listed a number of factors that could be considered when
applying the Section 2 tests.7 ' The Senate Report recognized
that the list was not exhaustive and that other unenumerated
factors might be considered if they were deemed relevant to the
analysis of the particular electoral law in question.75 The Sen69. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess. 16 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.CAN. 177, 193. Congress amended Section 2 in response to the Supreme
Court decision in Mobile v. Bolden, which required a showing of discriminatory intent to establish that a voting practice is discriminatory under Section 2. Id. (citing
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
72. Id.
73. S. REP. NO. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205.
74. Id. The factors which are relevant to a Section 2 challenge include:
1. [The] extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to
register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions,
or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to
public office in the jurisdiction.
S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong. 2d Seas. 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 206-07.
75. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
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ate Report provided that there was no requirement that a certain factor or a certain number of factors be established." The
determination of whether a violation occurred was to be based
on the judgment of the court.77
The Senate Report directed the courts to conduct a "searching
practical evaluation" of the existing political process. 7' To illustrate the functional approach, the Senate Report provided that
the fact a minority person voted or registered to vote would not
be "dispositive" of the issue of equal access.79
Lastly, Congress directed the courts to presume a causal connection between adverse conditions and depressed minority
political participation, once these factors were proven to exist80
Congress asserted that such adverse conditions tend to reduce
political participation rates in minority groups. 81 Congress relieved a Section 2 plaintiff of the burden of establishing such a
"causal nexus." 2
In 1984, the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Marengo
County Commission," used the totality of circumstances test of
the amended Section 2 to determine whether an Alabama atlarge election system diluted the minority vote in county commissioner and school board elections.' The government argued
that the at-large system, and not minority apathy, was responsible for the lack of minority electoral success in that the at-large
system worked with adverse conditions' to dilute minority voting strength."

U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207.
76. Id.
77. S. REP. No. 417 at 30, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207.
78. S. REP. No. 417 at 30, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 208.
79. S. REP. No. 417 at 30 n.120, 1982 U.S.C.CAN. at 208.
80. S. REP. No. 417 at 29 n.114, 1982 U.S.C.CAN. at 207.
81. Id.
82. S. REP. No. 417 at 29 n.114, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207.
83. 731 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1984).
84. Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1566.
85. Id. at 1567-73. The district court found evidence of racially polarized voting in the vote returns from elections conducted before and up to 1978. Id. There
were few African-American poll officials and the registrar held short office hours and
failed to visit surrounding rural communities where many African-Americans lived.
Id. African-Americans, on average, earned less than half of the amount white residents earned. Id. at 1570. Minorities were found to be subjected to social discrimination in such forms as segregated schools. Id.
86. Id. The district court discounted the significance of the adverse conditions
by attributing the lack of minority representation to minority apathy. Id. at 1568-69.
The district court reasoned that, based on the fact that there were 7,040 eligible
African-American voters in the county and that the winners of previous elections
won with a total count of 5000 - 6000 votes, the African-American community could
elect a representative if its members turned out to vote. Id. at 1568. The district
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The Eleventh Circuit found no evidence to support the district
court's conclusion of apathy.' The court, furthermore, interpreted the Senate Report, accompanying the amendment to
Section 2, to reject attempts to blame low minority political
M The Eleventh Circuit held
participation rates on apathy."
that
once adverse conditions were established, a Section 2 plaintiff
was relieved of the burden of proving the causal connection
between the adverse conditions and the depressed political participation."
The Eleventh Circuit, in Marengo, found that the historical
and electoral discrimination suffered by minorities, combined
with socio-economic disadvantages, resulted in depressed minority participation in the political process." Before the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that dilution occurred, the court considered
whether any factors weighed against the government's claim."
Finding no factor to weigh against the government's claim, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the at-large system worked with the
adverse conditions to weaken minority electoral power by submerging the minority voting population into the dominant white
population.92 The Eleventh Circuit held that dilution occurred,
and remanded the case in order to permit the parties to update
the record with any recent evidence that would affect the court's
determination.9 3
In 1986, in Wesley v. Collins," the Sixth Circuit considered
whether a Tennessee law disenfranchising convicted felons violated Section 2 by disproportionately impacting the voting
strength of the African-American community." The Sixth Circuit asserted that the fact that the African-American community
suffered adverse conditions and was disproportionately impacted

court, consequently, rejected the claim that the at-large system diluted minority
voting power. Id. at 1550.
87. Id. at 1568.
88. Id.
89. Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1568.
90. Id. at 1574. The appeals court stated that the discriminatory and disadvantageous circumstances "impaired the ability of blacks to register and participate
actively in the electoral process." id. African-Americans registered and voted in "significantly lower numbers" than white residents. Id. at 1568.
91. Id. at 1574. Recognizing that the court lacked a formula to carry out this
balancing test, the court weighed the various factors by its own judgment. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1575. On remand, the district court held that county officials failed
to establish that circumstances sufficiently changed to effect the Court of Appeals
finding of discriminatory results as they related to the relevant electoral practices.
Clark v. Marengo County, 623 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D. Ala. 1985).
94. 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986).
95. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257.
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by the challenged law did not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that Section 2 was violated." The Sixth Circuit considered other social and governmental interests which weighed strongly in
the state's favor. 7 First, the Sixth Circuit found that the state
had compelling reasons to disenfranchise convicted felons."
Second, the Sixth Circuit noted that a convicted felon was disenfranchised by his own criminal act.' Third, the circuit court
found the law to be race-neutral."e Based on these factors, the
court concluded that the disproportionate impact on the AfricanAmerican community was not the result of the law disenfranchising felons and thus the law did not violate Section 2.101
In 1986, in Thornburg v. Gingles," the United States Supreme Court first considered a Section 2 challenge to an electoral practice." In Gingles, African-American citizens of North
Carolina sought to enjoin the state's installation of a multi-member districting plan on the grounds that the plan wrongfully
diluted the locally strong minority vote in violation of the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights
04
Act.
The Court interpreted Section 2 to require a plaintiff to prove
that the challenged practice interacted with social and historical
conditions to deny minorities equal access to the political process
and to frustrate their ability to elect preferred representatives. O The Court held that the challenged practice could be
invalidated if shown to act in concert with the surrounding cir-

96. Id. at 1260-61.
97. Id. at 1261.
98. Id. at 1261-62. The Sixth Circuit concluded that it was not unreasonable
for a state to deny criminals the right to vote because criminals should not be permitted to elect legislators, executives, prosecutors or judges who create and maintain
the laws which the criminal violates. Id. at 1261 (citing Green v. Board of Elections,
380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968)). The court also
emphasized the state's interest in preventing the perpetuation of organized crime.
Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1261.
99. Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
103. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34.
104. Id. The district court found that minorities were subjected to adverse conditions and after applying the totality of circumstances test of Section 2, found dilution to occur. Id. at 37-42. The district court, consequently, enjoined the state from
using the plan. Id. at 42.
105. Id. at 47. The Court stated that "[tihe essence of a [Section] 2 claim is
that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical
conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white
voters to elect their preferred representatives." Id.

1995

Recent Decisions

cumstances in producing discriminatory results."' 8
The Court also established a tri-partite test which it used to
determine whether dilution resulted from the operation of the
challenged districting scheme.0 7 The Court found that three
conditions had to exist in order to establish dilution: the minority group had to be large enough and geographically compact
enough to consist of a majority in a single-member district; the
minority group had to be politically cohesive; and the majority
had to sufficiently act as a bloc to prevent minority groups from
electing preferred candidates." 8 The Court asserted that the
element of racial polarization was relevant to the establishment
of the second precondition, namely whether the minority group
was sufficiently cohesive."° If a plaintiff could not show racial
polarization, the Court could find the lack of cohesiveness, not
the challenged law, to be the cause of minority underrepresentation.11
The Supreme Court, after a review of the trial record, concluded that the district court's determination that minorities had
been subjected to historical, electoral and socio-economic conditions which adversely affected their ability to participate in the
political process was proper."' The Court found that the white
majority vote acted as an obstacle to the success of minority
preferred candidates."' In this way, the Court determined that
the multi-member districting plan diluted the minority vote by

106. Id. at 80.
107. Id. at 50-51.
108. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
109. id. at 56.
110. Id. The Court noted that an examination of racial polarization required a
"discrete" inquiry into voting practices. Id.
111. Id. at 80. The district court found that minorities had been, historically
discriminated against through the employment of poll taxes and literacy tests, and
minority voting registration remained low after the removal of these obstacles. Id. at
38-39. In 1982, 52.7 percent of the eligible African-American population registered to
vote as contrasted to 66.7 percent of eligible white residents. Id. at 39. The court
found evidence that African-American residents of North Carolina suffered disadvantages in employment, income, housing and education. Id. North Carolina utilized a
majority vote requirement in primary elections and lacked a subdistrict residency
requirement for members of the general assembly elected from the multi-member
districts. Id. The district court found evidence of racially polarized voting based on
an analysis which revealed that in 51 elections the degree of racial bloc voting was
so significant that the results would have been different if the elections were only
held between white or black voters. Id. at 52-54. Though African-American candidates were successful in the 1982 General Assembly election, the district court found
that, overall, the electoral success of minority candidates was low in proportion to
the minority population. Id. at 41.
112. Id. at 80.
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acting "in concert" with the surrounding circumstances." 3 After a review of the record, the Court concluded that the district
court did not err in its conclusion that the districting plan
caused unequal access to the political process.114
In 1989, the Fourth Circuit, in Irby v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,"' considered a Section 2 challenge to Virginia's appointive system for selecting school board members."1 " In Irby,
the appellants alleged that the appointive system denied minorities equal access to the political system."' The appellants contended that minorities were underrepresented on county school
boards in proportion to the minority population."' In addition,
the appellants alleged that minorities were underrepresented on
the governing bodies which appointed members to the school
boards. 19 The appellants sought class certification. 2
The Fourth Circuit determined that the appointive system
was open to minority persons and that the disparity was the
result of minorities not seeking school board positions. 2' The
Fourth Circuit found no proof of a causal link between the appointive system and the fact that minorities were underrepresented.'2 2 The circuit court held that the appointive system did not cause minority underrepresentation and denied
appellant's requested relief.2 '
In Operation PUSH v. Mabus,'24 the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a Mississippi legislative enactment sufficiently
addressed two electoral practices which were determined to be
discriminatory by the "totality of circumstances" test of Section

113. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.
114. Id.
115. 889 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1989).
116. Irby, 889 F.2d at 1353.
117. Id. at 1358.
118. Id. The district court found "significant disparity" in two of the five counties in question. Id. In Buckingham County, the district court found that AfricanAmericans constituted 42 percent of the population yet only held 14.2 percent of the
counties school board seats. Id. at 1355 (citing Irby v. Fitz-Hugh, 693 F. Supp. 424,
430 (E.D. Va. 1988)). In Halifax County, the district court found that African-Americans comprised 40 percent of the population yet only held 22.2 percent of the
county's school board seats. Irby, 889 F.2d at 1358.
119. Irby, 889 F.2d at 1358. Appellants argued that the governing bodies which
appointed members to the school board were composed of mostly white officials. Id.
at 1359.
120. Id. at 1353.
121. Id. at 1358. The district court found that since 1971, every AfricanAmerican who had sought a school board position was appointed. Id.
122. ld. at 1359.
123. Irby, 889 F.2d at 1359.
124. 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991).
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2.25 The plaintiffs in Operation PUSH argued that
Mississippi's dual registration process' and the lack of a state
satellite registration system 27 denied minorities equal access
to the political process. 2 '
The Eleventh Circuit noted that African-American citizens of
Mississippi voted at a twenty-five percent lower rate than
whites.'29 The circuit court attributed this disparity to two circumstances.' First, a large percentage of African-Americans
in Mississippi lacked the needed transportation to reach the
registrar's office.' Second, the court noted that African-Americans lacked the type of employment that facilitated registering
to vote during business hours.32 The Eleventh Circuit accepted
the district court's conclusion that the dual registration system
and the lack of satellite registration facilities interacted with the
circumstances to deny minorities equal access to the political
process. 33 The Eleventh Circuit, however, denied the plaintiff's
request to have the new statutes declared unconstitutional,
finding that recent legislation sufficiently addressed the problem1."3

125. Operation PUSH, 932 F.2d at 402.
126. A dual registration process requires citizens to register with the county
registrar in order to be eligible to vote in federal, state and county elections and
requires them to register with the municipal clerk to vote in local elections. Id.
127. A satellite registration system facilitates registration locations outside of
the registrar's office. Id. In this case, the Mississippi legislature enacted a statute
which forbade the registrar to remove the registration books from the county registration office except in limited circumstances. Id.
128. Operation PUSH, 932 F.2d at 403.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Operation PUSH, 932 F.2d at 409-13. Applying the "totality of circumstances" test of Section 2, the district court found that the dual registration system
and the lack of satellite registration facilities interacted with the circumstances to
remove minorities from the political process. id. at 404 (citing Mississippi State
Chapter, Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245, 1251 (N.D. Miss. 1987)).
Even though the court found the practices to be discriminatory, the court denied the
plaintiffs injunctive relief and instead gave the legislature an opportunity to change
the statutes. Operation PUSH, 932 F.2d at 404.
134. Operation PUSH, 932 F.2d at 413.
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In 1992, in Salas v. Southwest Texas Junior College District,' the Fifth Circuit considered whether the district court
erred when it attributed Hispanic underrepresentation to a
failure to vote rather than to the at-large voting system.13 In
Salas, the plaintiff alleged that the at-large system employed
violated Section 2 by diluting the voting strength of the Hispanic
voting majority.'3 7
At trial, the district court noted that plaintiffs established the
38
first two conditions required by the Gingles tri-partite test.1
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit limited its review to whether
plaintiffs met the third condition, namely whether white bloc
voting existed.'39 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the underlying inquiry of the third condition concerned whether the at-large
system caused the plaintiffs inability to elect preferred representatives. 4 ' To carry out this inquiry, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the lack of electoral success was attributable to
other factors besides the working of the at-large system.'
The Fifth Circuit, in Salas, found that the Hispanic community did suffer past official discrimination and disadvantage in the
areas of education and income. Although the Fifth Circuit
found that Hispanic voting turnout was low, voting registration
was high." Based on this finding, the Fifth Circuit found no
link between low voter turnout and the adverse conditions.'"
The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the high level of Hispanic
registration strongly suggested that the Hispanic community did

135. 964 F.2d 1542 (5th Cir. 1992).
136. Sals, 964 F.2d at 1543-44. The district court found that in forty-four
years, only two out of twenty-three persons named to the district's Board of Trustees
were Hispanic. Id. at 1544.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1553.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51).
141. Salas, 964 F.2d at 1554.
142. Id. at 1552. The Fifth Circuit found that 41.6 percent of the Hispanic
community were functionally illiterate or had completed fewer than four years of a
formal education, whereas, the white community had only a 4.1 percent illiteracy
rate. ld. Only 20.5 percent of the Hispanic community had graduated from high
school, as contrasted to 64 percent of white residents. Id. Eighty-one percent of
those who held college degrees were white. Id. Approximately 37 percent of Hispanic
families were below the poverty level as contrasted to 11 percent of white families.
Id.
143. Id. at 1543, 1556. The plaintiffs submitted evidence that Hispanic turnout
was seven percent below that of white registrants. Id. at 1556. The district court
found that 53 percent of the registered voters in the district had Spanish surnames
and that Hispanics constituted a majority of the registered voters in the district. Id.
at 1544.
144. Id. at 1555-56.
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not suffer from depressed political participation."4 The court
held that the district court did not err in its conclusion that
Hispanic underrepresentation was caused by the failure of Hispanics to vote and not to the operation of the at-large system. 14 Thus, the court concluded that the Texas at-large system did not violate Section 2.147
An analysis of the Third Circuit's holding in Oritz v. Philadelphia must begin with the term "dispositive force."" The majority stated that the term was to be understood in its legal
sense. "9 As the dissent correctly noted, the term can be interpreted to mean that a dispositive force is a force which is exclusive of other forces, or principally the force which causes something to occur." ° Yet, the majority could not have intended
such an interpretation, for, the totality of circumstances test of
Section 2 precludes such a meaning.
A word is sometimes more clearly understood by analyzing its
origin. The court's use of the concept of "dispositive force" arose
from the tension between the court's finding of apathy and the
Appellants' assertion that the non-voting purge statute was, in
part, the cause of minorities being deprived of their right to
vote. The 'concept of dispositive force originated in the court's
need for clarity in the evidence that the purge law, and not some
other factor, like apathy, caused the deprivation of voting rights.
The majority interpreted Gingles to require "some causal connection.""'' This quantitative description is inconsistent with the
dissent's definition of dispositive force as the only cause or the
principal cause of discrimination. The majority approach reasonably requires a showing that the electoral law affects the denial
of voting rights.
This construction is not unfounded. While Wesley and Irby
asserted that Section 2 requires the establishment of a causal
link between the challenged electoral practice and its discriminatory effects, the vote dilution cases, exemplified by White and
Gingles, more adequately described the relationship between the
challenged electoral law and the factors involved and the resultant loss of voting strength. Assuming the pre-conditions of the
tri-partite test are present, a multi-member districting scheme

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1556.
Sa/aB, 964 F.2d at 1556.
Id.
See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 313 n.11.
Id.
See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 323 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Oritz, 28 F.3d at 310.
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actually weakens the voting strength of minorities by submerging them into the majority. A single member district scheme
increases the voting power of minorities. Thus, the schemes
clearly and directly affect voting phenomena. When one precondition is not present, the court can attribute the lack of representation to the absence of this condition. The multi-member
system cannot then be said to cause the lack of representation.
The term "dispositive" carries unwanted baggage. However,
courts should recognize how the district court and the majority
used the term. The court did not look for the purge statute as
the only cause or as the principal cause. The court required a
Section 2 plaintiff to show that it was the purge statute, acting
in the circumstances, and not some other supervening factor,
that caused the loss of voting rights.
The most troublesome aspects of the majority opinion concern
the recognition of apathy as a valid factor and the legal significance the court gave to apathy without inquiring into its validity. One must first question whether the majority could properly
consider apathy as the culpable factor after the Appellant established that minorities in Philadelphia suffered from discrimination and disadvantage and that minority political participation
was depressed. If respect is to be given to the legislative history
accompanying the amendment to Section 2, it would seem that
the court was precluded from speculating as to the cause of the
depressed political participation. As Judge Lewis and the court
in Marengo pointed out, according to the guideline announced in
the Senate Report, the Section 2 plaintiff is supposed to be relieved of the burden of establishing a causal connection between
the adverse conditions and depressed minority political participation." 2 Introducing the possibility of apathy into the analysis creates the burden of disproving apathy. Under this analysis,
the only way a Section 2 plaintiff can disprove an alternative
causal theory is to produce a causal theory of his or her own. As
a result, the Section 2 plaintiff is burdened with establishing a
causal connection between the adverse conditions and the depressed political participation.
The majority believes that this inquiry is justified because
minorities, who have registered to vote, have overcome or have
risen above the adverse conditions typically existent in minority
communities. This conclusion is suspect. To conclude that a
minority individual who has registered to vote has, through this
act, separated himself from the environment in which he lives,

152.

See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 325; Marengo, 731 F.2d at 1568.
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defies a practical evaluation of reality if made without strict
inquiry. The majority stated that for a variety of historical reasons minorities have voted less than white registrants; in other
words, minorities have not taken advantage of their opportunity
to vote. i" 3 Perhaps the Oritz conclusion concerning apathy is
correct. If the possibility of apathy is to be considered, assuming
that its introduction is proper, it seems that further inquiry is
needed to establish the proposition. 54
Perhaps the reason minorities failed to take advantage of
their opportunity to vote was because of their frustration with
the process;... language barriers which did not go away after
first registering;"" or harsh socio-economic conditions which
were overcome when they first registered but have since returned. The majority's conclusion that the adverse conditions are
irrelevant without further inquiry is improper. Congress specifically stated that even though a minority person votes or registers to vote, such evidence should not be considered dispositive
on the issue of equal access."5 7
This criticism could appropriately be raised against the Salas
opinion, on which the Oritz majority relied. Salas did not find
Hispanic political participation to be depressed because, though
voting turnout was low, registration was high.5 8 The Salas
court, like the majority in Oritz, considered the act of registering
a intervening factor. 59 However, like the majority in Oritz, the
Salas court apparently failed to inquire into the reasons why
Hispanics failed to vote. Again, the inclusion of the factor of
apathy necessitates more inquiry and the court should avoid
such simplified conclusions. As Judge Lewis rightly pointed out,
the majority failed to conduct a searching, practical analysis." °
The majority of the Third Circuit in Oritz unfortunately accepted a term that can be misused. Courts hereafter should
understand that the majority used the concept of "dispositive
force" with the purpose of clarity and distinction and not with
the purpose of emasculating the totality of circumstances test.
Of great concern is the courts' apparent tendency to conclude
that a minority individual has overcome the adverse conditions

153. See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 316.
154. See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 325 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 326.
156. Id. at 336-40.
157. See S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Ses. 30 n.120 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208.
158. Salas, 964 F.2d at 1556.
159. Id. at 1555-56.
160. See Oritz, 28 F.3d at 322 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
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of his or her environment after he or she simply registers to
vote. It is questionable whether this act is sufficient to lead to
such a conclusion. Additionally, it is questionable whether apathy is a legitimate consideration once the Section 2 plaintiff
establishes adverse conditions and depressed political participation. If apathy is legitimately considered, a thorough analysis
should be conducted to determine its true source.
Marc Mellett

